First, it is
important to set-up a short description of the most recent background to the
conflict. It is not possible to detail
the entire conflict in any detail without writing at least one book, so only a
brief overview of the most recent events can be achieved. Attempting to isolate this current crisis
from the rest of the conflict as much as possible, the most likely starting
point was Israel’s targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders. This lead Hamas and any other like-minded
groups to retaliate by firing rockets into Israel, something some Palestinians
probably barely needed provocation to do.
What makes this particularly dangerous for Israel is that the
Palestinians in the West Bank have upgraded their munitions with smuggled
weaponry, most likely from Iran, which can now reach further into Israel and
cause more damage. Thus, Israel feels
that it must take action to disable such armaments in order to, at the very
least, protect its citizens, so it has stepped up its targeted assassinations
and has tried to destroy weapons and missile staging grounds. However, air (and recently even maritime)
raids have only limited effectiveness against such a mobile and guerilla
operations, so Israel has decided to marshal its forces near the border in bid
to stage a ground offensive. Many
countries have started to intervene in an attempt to halt the hostilities;
these countries include but are not limited to Turkey, Egypt, America, and the
UK along with some of the European Union.
However, there are many forces that are conspiring to prevent a
successful resolution of this crisis.
First, despite Israel’s modern-day precision weaponry, collateral damage on the Palestinian side has been extensive (last counts were around 100 Palestinians, around half civilians, have died while only 5 Israelis, one may not be a civilian but military, have died). Israel has expressed little discomfort over the ensuing human cost on the other side, blaming how embedded Hamas is in the community presupposing that Hamas is using the Palestinian people as a human shield and the urgency of their current mission to protect their citizenry. However, Israel has never held the Palestinian people and their lives to a very high regard as their mere presence is an obstacle to a unified Israeli state in that Israel can’t kick them out of the West Bank, and they have no desire to be absorbed into a larger Jewish state. Israel (as a state) cannot directly kill the Palestinians as this would cause international condemnation, and it is hard to imagine that the population of any state would be supportive of such an action even if it came with promises of increased security. Collateral damage while targeting Hamas installations, on the other hand, reduces the grounds for international condemnation and is easily justified to internal citizens. This approach, however, comes with a major drawback as Palestinians, who may have been moderate or even progressive, are effectively ideologically pushed toward extremism. For example, the entire extended family of the victims of the dead civilians now see the Israeli state as the unjustified aggressor and have a strengthened desire to see the removal of Israel. Thus, Israel’s approach has, in fact, created more potential combatants than actually reducing the number, much like the cutting off the head of a hydra and having two additional heads taking its place.
Second, the Arab Spring
revolutions have dramatically altered the power distribution of the area. For example, potentially working in Israel’s
favor, the current civil war in Syria leaves an army that would typically be
against Israel (in fact, is still technically in a state of war with Israel) is
now tied up battling its own people and as such cannot come to Hamas’ aid. On the other hand, Egypt’s recent revolution
may actually be a boon to Hamas since the previous government was hampered by an
internationally approved peace treaty with Israel and because Hamas and the new
Egyptian government are under the same umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood. While Egypt may not be one hundred percent in
a capacity to devote military resources to a battle in the West Bank, it
ideologically and politically leans toward Hamas, has vocally opposed an
Israeli ground invasion of the area, and is looking to make a name for itself
in the region; thus, there is a greater chance that Egypt will be willing to go
further in its support of Hamas than a non-aligned state would, possibly even
up to and including arming Hamas or militarily intervening.
As for other states, Iran has
been, of course, a supporter of Hamas and an opponent of Israel, but the other
states around Israel are more complicated. For instance, while Jordan has not suffered a
major revolution, it does have slight civil unrest that would probably expand
should it intervene too far, but it also has a sizeable Palestinian refugee
population that is most likely full of anti-Israeli sentiments and would not be
opposed to actions against Israel.
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, however, are not very mainstreamed so
their views may not fully balance out those voices opposing military
intervention. Turkey, however, is much
more supportive of Hamas but may not be in a position to offer immediate
militaristic intervention via the ground, assuming that it ever got to that
point as Turkey’s commitment to the West Bank may be more confined to
ideological and political support rather than a predominantly resource based
role. Finally, Iraq is in an interesting
position as much of its infrastructure has been damaged, and it is still
fighting internal battles with dissidents.
Additionally, its current government has been oscillating between a
close relationship with Western powers and integration into the wider Arab
world, a move which puts it at odd with some Western powers (namely the United
States).
Therefore, overall, Hamas could be in a slightly stronger position with Egypt, Turkey, and Iran which could outweigh the losses of Iraq and Syria. Israel, on the other hand, benefits from Syria’s absence and has always had America’s full support ever since America’s theological shift. What is Israel’s main problem, however, is not really Hamas’ military strength or potential resources from its allies as Israel has the resources and political clout to defeat Hamas (and probably even Egypt and Turkey should they join in the fight). As example, just look at the current death tolls from the conflict so far, Palestine has lost twenty times more people than Israel, and the ratio is becoming more and more imbalanced each day. What Israeli’s really have to fear is their social capital, a fact that Hamas knows very well, and Israel has much of its social capital invested in its status as a victim that is always at the mercy of Arab (and gentiles as a whole for that matter). The mantra of victimization and its resonant mantra of a need for security has played out through almost every negotiation, if not every negotiation, that Israel has been a party to, it even underlies the Zionist movement that founded the nation of Israel. Should Israel engage in a ground war in the West Bank, the resulting bloodbath may jeopardize its position as a victim since the international mood seems to be against a ground invasion (as seen by the statements of William Hague the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom) and the imbalanced ratio of Palestinian to Israeli deaths would show the imbalance of power in region. If Israel can no longer be the victim, it will have a hard time keeping the implicit support of all of its Western allies, and with less support it will be under more of the international pressures that are felt by other nations such as South Africa a few decades ago.
Faced even with the slight possibility of a loss of social capital, it would make sense for Israel to continue its current air and maritime campaign without engaging in a ground offensive. However, Israel has its own internal struggles to deal with. With the current leading political party just forming a new coalition with an even further right-wing political party in order to stay in power, there is strong political pressure to go to war in the West Bank if only to keep internal political clout. Add to that, the fact that almost all Israelis have extensive military training and access to weapons, and as psychological research shows, the mere fact that weapons are present in an environment increases the hostility in individuals. On top of all of that, there is even another layer; the state of Israel is going through growing pains. As an example, the amount of fresh water available in the region is scarce, making it a competitive resource over which Israelis feel they have to protect in order to survive. Thus, Israel appears to be trapped between widening the conflict and maintaining the current level of aggression. The direction it ultimately takes will probably depend on the mediation efforts of other nations, most likely Egypt this time around due to America’s constraints about talking to Hamas. If Hamas is convinced to take a lull in firing rockets, then Israel will have an exceedingly hard time not looking like the aggressor, a role it would like to avoid. Either way, it should be an interesting week.
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